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Abstract
A distributed hybrid strategy is outlined for the isolation of faults and disturbances in
the Tennessee Eastman Process, which would build on existing structures for
distributed control systems, so should be easy to implement, be cheap and be widely
applicable.  The main emphasis in the paper is on one component of the strategy, a
steady state based approach.  Results obtained by applying this approach are
presented and knowledge limitations are discussed.  In particular a way in which a
knowledge-base might evolve to improve isolation capabilities is suggested and the
role of the operator is briefly discussed.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays, feedback control loop components can be smart and have self-
computational capabilities linked by a high-speed, bi-directional data communication
bus that allows the central supervisory system to interrogate devices for status and
other information.  If one looks at the measurements collected from a continuously
operated process plant, a large proportion relate to control loops, the rest are largely
collected to ensure that operation is within allowable constraints.  Since these control
loops are distributed throughout the plant, it seems sensible to examine the possibility
of distributing associated detection & diagnosis tasks with them.  These tasks would
aim to isolate faults and disturbances in both the control loop and in that part of the
process that impinges on control loop performance.  Economies of scale would then
be achieved by making use of common software to configure the tasks at the same
time as individual loops were tuned.  Clearly these economies of scale would be
diminished if the algorithms were too plant specific and required knowledge not
readily available from the plant. Fig. 1 shows the kind of implementation envisaged:
the SEVACS (self-validating control systems) modules would perform detection &
diagnostic tasks.  The term SEVACS was chosen to highlight a certain similarity with
the SEVA concept (Clarke, 1995), which seeks to distribute local detection &
diagnosis tasks to instruments and actuators.  The main conceptual difference is that
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2part of the process is covered also.  The boundaries specified for individual SEVACS
module responsibilities should overlap one another and their union should encompass
the entire plant.  This overlapping means that complete distribution will not be
achieved because individual SEVACS conclusions need to be correlated.  Comparison
would be performed by the FDD Supervisor, which would also perform centralised
detection & diagnostic tasks and provide an interface with the user.  In a previous
paper Chen & Howell (2001) have described one possible approach to designing
SEVACS modules.  By focusing on an application, the Tennessee Eastman (T-E)
Process Benchmark, this paper seeks to demonstrate this design methodology and to
identify the additional functions that are needed to produce a complete capability. The
T-E benchmark is a particularly appropriate choice, because the proposed approach is
intended to be used to isolate incipient faults and disturbances in plants with control
loops that inherently eliminate steady state error, and control loops in the Benchmark
possess this capability. 
The motivation for this research stems from the fact that although a considerable
amount has been published about detection algorithms that could be distributed, little
has been published about algorithms, to isolate1 a fault or major disturbance, which
can be distributed.  Although a number of detection algorithms might be sufficiently
local to locate a specific fault, in general less is available to isolate (Chow & Willsky,
1984; Basseville & Nikiforov, 1993; Gertler, 1993, 1998; Himmelblau, 1978;
Isermann, 1984, 1997).  Based on qualitative reasoning, the proposed approach has
been developed, in part, by referring to SDG representations of control systems and
their interactions. Although the application of SDG-based reasoning to fault diagnosis
is not new, previous work has focused on the process plant, with its associated control
and sensory systems, as a single entity (e.g. Iri et al., 1979; Shiozaki et al., 1984;
Tsuge et al., 1984a, 1984b; Kramer & Palowitch, 1987; Kutsuwa, Kojima &
Matsuyama, 1988; Mo et al., 1997).  Although not directly relevant because the
approach cannot be distributed, it is interesting that Vedam and Venkatasubramanian
(1999) have developed a hybrid approach based on PCA and SDG. Wang et al. (1995)
have applied fuzzy qualitative reasoning method to assess process plants whilst Lunze
and Schiller (1999) have explored fault diagnosis based on qualitative and
probabilistic logic models. There also have been a number of papers published
recently on control loop performance monitoring (Harris, 1989; Thornhill et al., 1996,
1999; Tyler & Morari, 1996). Nevertheless its aim is to assess the behaviour of the
control loop itself such as whether the control loop works in a good or optimal
condition, and whether tuning parameters (e.g., P, I or D) are satisfied. The method
itself is immune to load disturbances and it lacks the ability to isolate faults. Finally
the reader is referred to Chantler, Coghill, Shen, & Leitch (1998), which is considered
noteworthy because it outlines various implementations that have been examined in
realistic situations.
The paper has five main sections.  The steady state approach is outlined in Section 2
and this is followed, in Section 3, by a brief description of other components of the
strategy.  Section 4 then describes how these might be applied to the Benchmark.
Section 5 discusses some results and conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
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32. The Distributed Steady State Approach
The steady state approach has two components, a distributed component and a central
component.  In the distributed component candidate sets of faults and disturbances are
hypothesised by reasoning qualitatively about how steady state deviations, observed
in the control system, might have been caused.  This reasoning process is based on
qualitative equations derived for that particular form of control system.  Two standard
forms are considered briefly in Section 2.1: a single loop control system and a cascade
control system.  The reader is referred to Chen & Howell (2001) and Chen (2000) for
further details.  As will be seen when describing the T-E application, non-standard
forms can be analysed in a similar way.  In the central component the candidate sets
generated by the various SEVACS are then fused by applying various isolation
procedures, all of which take into account known interactions between control
systems and sign information output from the SEVACS. These procedures are
outlined in Section 2.2.
The steady state approach would be implemented in two stages, as part of the (offline)
design stage and then, online, during commissioning.  At the offline stage the plant
would be decomposed into manageable compartments and each control system would
be considered in turn.  The following characteristics would then be
identified/hypothesised for each control system: 
• its structure, i.e. whether it has a standard form like a single loop or double,
cascade loops or whether a new special form has to be recognised;
• the process Type Number (Dorf & Bishop, 1995) (if known);
• open loop stability (if known);
• steady state gains between interacting loops (if known).
Based on these characteristics, an appropriate configuration would then be
downloaded to the SEVACS.  During commissioning, online procedures would then
be executed to obtain those items that were still unknown.  These previously
unpublished, on-line procedures are outlined in Section 2.3.  In addition the SEVACS
would be configured to detect changes in steady state (see Chen & Howell, 2001) and
the FDD supervisor would be specified.
2.1 Analysis of The Standard Forms
Consider the standard single loop control system shown in Fig. 2 where various
variables represent steady state deviations: θr is the deviation in the set-point/reference
variable, θ in the controlled variable, e in the control error, dm in the sensor bias, dv in
the valve bias, dp in the process disturbance, x in the controller output. Parameter Kc is
the steady state proportional gain of the controller and parameters Kv, Kp and Kd are
respectively the valve, process and process disturbance steady state gains.  Transfer
functions Gc(s), Gv(s), Gp(s) and Gd(s) are for the controller, valve, process and
disturbance respectively.
If steady state error is eliminated inherently (e.g. by a PI controller), then when the
control system is in a steady state, e=0 so that
θ θ= −r md                                     (1)
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If the controlled process has a Type Number of zero, then these equations can be
converted to their qualitative forms:
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A qualitative variable [z] is merely defined as the sign of a deviation z (De Kleer &
Brown, 1984; Forbus, 1984) . Qualitative deviation [z] has four values: ‘+’ means z
deviates high; ‘−’ means z deviates low; ‘0’ means z has no change and ‘?’ means the
deviation of z cannot be decided.  {K} represents the qualitative sign of the gain K, it
can be viewed as an operator on a qualitative variable [z] and hence doesn’t exist
independently. {K} only has two values: ‘+’ means K>0 and ‘−’ means K<0.
Qualitative Equations 3 & 4 indicate that any change in θr, dm, dp and dv would cause
the controlled variable θ and/or the controller output x to deviate. By observing [x]
and [θ], the cause of the change, e.g. a fault or disturbance, can be detected and to
some extent isolated.  The latter might not be observed directly but could be reasoned
from its effect on other process variables (i.e. on its descendants),   Table 1 shows the
knowledge for isolation.  If there is ONLY one cause, then the sign or direction can be
determined by the equations because, with the exception of {Kd}, the qualitative gains
in the equations would be known once the control system is designed.  Note that if the
controlled process has a Type Number > 0, i.e. the process is capacitive, then the
proportional gains Kp and Kd tend to infinity and according to Equation 4, a deviation
in [x] is not caused by a deviation in [θr] and [dm] but only in [dp] or [dv].   Table 1
should be modified in this case. 
Similarly the following qualitative equations can be derived for the standard cascade
control system shown in Fig. 3:
1 1[ ] [ ] [ ]r mdθ θ= −                                (5)
1 11
2
1 1 1
{ }[ ][ ][ ][ ]
{ } { } { }
d pmr
p p p
K dd
K K K
θθ = − −                     (6)   
1 11
1 2
1 1 1
{ }[ ][ ][ ][ ] [ ]
{ } { } { }
d pmr
m
p p p
K ddx d
K K K
θ= − − +                              (7)           
1 1
2
1 2 1 2
2 21
1 2 2
{ }[ ][ ][ ]
{ } { }
{ }[ ][ ] [ ]
{ } { } { }
d pr
p p v p p v
d pm v
p p v p v v
K d
x
K K K K K K
K dd d
K K K K K K
θ= −
− − −
                                       (8)    
5Table 2 shows the rule-set that can be derived from these equations.  Note also that if
either the outer loop controlled process or the inner loop controlled process has a
Type Number >0, then either Kp1 & Kd1 or Kp2 & Kd2 tend to infinity, and Equations 5-
8 & Table 1 should be modified accordingly. 
Analysed individually, little could be deduced about a cause; the power of the
approach lies in making use of knowledge about control system steady state
interactions. If a controlled variable, θ, in one control system deviates then it can
disturb another control system.  This leads to sets of coupled equations, which can be
analysed simultaneously.  Although certain faults, like a sensor bias, might be isolated
within a SEVACS where Equations 3-4 or 5-8 would be applied to produce sets of
candidates, most faults would have to be isolated centrally when all these sets are
collated.  This leads on to fault isolation, which is described in the next sub-section.
2.2 Fault Isolation
The fault isolation principle stated in italics in the next paragraph can be deduced
from the basic equations derived in the previous section. 
Any steady state deviation in any control system must be caused either by a fault in a
loop element such as in the sensor or in the actuator/valve or by a process
disturbance. Although, by the application of appropriate simple heuristic rules, it is
very easy to isolate faults like a dead sensor, or a large exogenous fault or
disturbance, or a sticking valve, it is more difficult to isolate faults like a sensor bias,
or a small exogenous fault/disturbance. In these circumstances, the controlled
variable, and its effect on descendants, is arguably the key to fault isolation: with a
sensor bias, the controlled variable will deviate from its nominal value and
descendants of the controlled variable will be affected; with a valve bias, or with an
exogenous fault/disturbance, the controlled variable will remain at its nominal value
and its descendants will not be affected. 
Note that this principal holds irrespective of whether the process within the control
loop has a Type number of zero or not.  It was seen in the Section 2.1 that, any
standard controller whose process has a zero Type Number would deviate when
subjected to a sensor bias, whereas this would not happen if the Type Number > 0.
Thus, for processes with Type Numbers > 0, a sensor bias would still affect the
descendants of the respective controlled variable even though it would not cause the
controlled variable, itself, to deviate.
Note also that, because control systems can interact, descendants and exogenous
faults and disturbances can stem from another control system.  This leads to the
search and test strategy shown in Fig. 4.  Starting from a deviated variable in a control
system and by referring to the equations and knowledge described in the last section,
a search strategy first finds all possible faults or disturbances.  A test strategy then
isolates those faults or disturbances that would result in the observed deviations.  The
search is performed by backward reasoning whilst testing is carried out by forward
reasoning.  All the deviated control systems are audited and the root faults can be
located.  Involving all control systems, this search and test strategy would be easily
implemented in the Supervisor.  A number of improvements can be made to the
procedure to reduce the amount of search and testing (Chen, 2000).  It is worth noting
that obviously the Supervisor could be replaced by a human operator. 
62.3 Identifying Interactions
This sub-section explores how interactions can be hypothesised by performing step
tests at the time control loops are commissioned. Knowledge of these interactions can
lead to the determination of the steady state gains in Section 2.1. With reference to the
standard control systems, there might be any of the following interactions:
(1) the interaction between a single-loop control system (or cascade outer loop)
and a measured variable,
(2) the interaction between two single-loop control systems or cascade outer
loops,
(3) the interaction between a cascade control system and a measured variable,
(4) the interaction between a cascade control system and a single loop control
system,
(5) the interaction between two cascade control systems.
Considering each in turn.  (1) Apply a step to the set-point: interaction RAB can be
obtained by looking at deviations in the controlled variable (A), DA, and in the
measured variable (B), DB, in the steady state.  (2) Apply steps to the set-points
separately: the change in one controlled variable can be viewed as a process
disturbance to the other, and then RAB and RBA can be determined by equations derived
in Section 2.1.  (3) Apply a step to the outer-loop: if there is a change in the measured
variable, this indicates that it is affected by this cascade control system. It is very
difficult to decide whether the outer, inner, or both loops, affect this variable, so if
possible, other related knowledge should then be used.  For instance if the outer loop
process is capacitive, it is certain that this would interact.  If the outer loop process is
not capacitive, for robust fault isolation, it is quite acceptable to assume it is the inner
loop controlled variable that interacts, because this assumption can accommodate the
other. (4) Is the same as for (3), but now the interaction is with the controlled variable
as opposed to the measured variable. (5) Is similar to (4).  Apply a step to the outer-
loop set-point: if the outer loop of the target controller deviates, then either the
interaction is with the outer-loop, or the inner-loop, or both.  If both, then interaction
with the inner loop can be neglected because it doesn’t affect the final diagnostic
result.  If only the inner loop controller deviates, then interaction is only with the
inner loop.
73. Other Components of The Hybrid Strategy
It is generally accepted that no single method is capable of isolating all possible faults
and major disturbances.  Hence the need for a strategy that contains a number of
components.  This section acknowledges the need for other components by briefly
describing two, heuristic rules and governing equations.  Other components would be
needed, for instance, to identify a gradual drift.  SEVA sensors/actuators or control
loop monitoring might also be available. 
3.1 Basic Heuristic Rules
Being based on observed changes in steady state, the approach described in Section 2
is not suited to diagnosing faults like a dead sensor, or a large exogenous fault (or
disturbance), or a sticking valve, which cause the plant to ‘run-away’.  Such faults can
be isolated by the application of appropriate simple heuristic rules.  This technique
has been widely adopted by many expert system based process monitoring and fault
diagnosis systems and has proven to be efficient (Becraft, Guo, Lee & Newell, 1991;
Becraft & Lee, 1993; Isermann & Balle, 1997, 1997b; Kramer, 1987; Leonhardt &
Ayoubi, 1997). 
The Benchmark is particularly amenable to a heuristic approach because of the
relatively high density of instrumentation installed (Howell, Chen & Zhang, 1997).
Typical rules are like:
FOR any flow-sensor LS
IF the sensor-reading of LS during the last 5 minutes has no value
THEN conclude that the status of LS is FAILED
Other rules can relate to the performance of individual control loops: a change in the
controller’s output should result in a change in the sensor-reading and also in the
measurement of valve opening (if available). It is relatively easy to detect faults such
as frozen/failed sensors and locked/stuck valves, by means of the simple heuristic
rule:
1. examine the maximum and the minimum output of the controller during the last
few minutes; if the difference between them is large enough, then perform next
step;
2. examine the maximum and minimum measurement of the sensor during the last
few minutes; if the difference between them is too small, then conclude that there
might be something wrong with either the sensor or the valve: if the maximum is
close to zero, it is most likely that the has sensor failed, otherwise either the sensor
froze or the valve locked.
Some faults or disturbances can cause global changes in a plant. It is a good idea to
use this piece of information to limit the number of possible candidate solutions.
3.2 Governing Equations
Various ambiguities that arise when applying the method in Section 2 can be
eliminated by comparing with a set of fault candidates, which pertain specifically to
sensor biases and leaks, and are produced by analysing a set of mathematical
constraints known as governing equations [Kramer, 1987].  The basic idea is
discussed here, then illustrated in the application.
8Here, governing equations describe steady state flow balances.  For instance, the sum
of the flows out of a process unit should equal the sum of the flows into the unit, if it
is in steady state and there is no leak.  If every flow rate measurement can be
represented by
true flow rate + sensor bias (B) = sensor reading (R)
then a governing equation can be constructed as
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where RIi is the sensor reading of the ith flow in, BIi is the sensor bias of the ith flow in,
ROj is the sensor reading of the jth flow out, BOj is the sensor bias of the jth flow out,
Leak is any ‘loss’ from the system: Leak≥ 0, and E is the difference between the sum
of sensor readings of the inputs and outputs. That is 0E ≈ unless there is a significant
bias or leak.  For instance, if FI−FO=0 represents the mass balance of a process unit,
then RI−RO=0 unless there is something wrong. If the left-hand side of this expression
is significantly less than zero, then the inference (FI -SENSOR-BIAS-LOW) or (FO -
SENSOR-BIAS-HIGH) can be established; if the expression is significantly greater
than zero, then the inference (FI -SENSOR-BIAS-HIGH) or (FO -SENSOR-BIAS-
LOW) or (SYSTEM-LEAK) can be established. Importantly, these conditions are the
only explanations for violation of the constraint (assuming no leaks into the system).
A fault candidate set can now be constructed by looking at the logical combination of
these inferences.
94 Application to The Tennessee Eastman Process Benchmark
The Tennessee Eastman process benchmark (Downs & Vogel, 1993) is a simulation
of a real plant that has been disguised for proprietary reasons, the flow diagram and its
basic control scheme are shown in Fig. 5.  The process involves the production of two
products, G and H, and one by-product F, from four reactants: A, C, D and E:
A (g) + C (g) + D (g) → G (liq) Product 1
A (g) + C (g) + E (g) → H (Iiq) Product 2 (10)
             A (g) + E (g) → F (liq)   By-product 
                      3 D (g) → 2 F (Iiq)  By-product
The process has five major units: a reactor, a product condenser, a vapour/liquid
separator, a recycle compressor and a product stripper. The reactor is a two-phase
CSTR in which exothermic, irreversible reactions occur.  A non-volatile catalyst is
dissolved in the liquid phase. The products have moderate volatility, and flow out of
the reactor with the unreacted gases.  The partial condenser recovers them from the
recycle gas. The stripper minimises losses of D and E from the liquid product.
Overhead from the stripper combines with the off-gas from the partial condenser for
recycle to the reactor. An inert component B makes up about 0.5% of feed stream 4.
It is non-condensable and must exit in the purge (stream 9 in Fig. 5). The purge can
also be used to prevent build-up of excess reactants (if any), and the byproduct F.  The
plant must operate over a wide range of product composition (from a G:H ratio of 9:1,
to 1:9); the amount of component E in the product is regulated by varying the stripper
top temperature.  The process has 41 measurements and 12 manipulated variables.  A
plant-wide decentralised control scheme has been developed by McAvoy et al. that is
based on multiple single-input-single-output (SISO) control loops.  Many of them are
standard cascade control systems. Further details of the process and its control
systems can be found in (Howell, Chen & Zhang, 1997; McAvoy & Ye, 1994;
McAvoy, Ye &Chen, 1995).
The Benchmark can be viewed as having 9 distributed control systems each of which
can have a SEVACS associated with it (Table 3, Figs. 6 & 7).  It can be seen that SV4
is a single loop control system, SV1, SV5 and SV6 are standard cascade control
systems, SV3 and SV9 are cascade control systems with two inner loops, and SV2,
SV7 and SV8 look more complicated because they incorporate a common sensor.
Such peculiar loops obviously weaken the argument for standardisation.  However,
and as will be demonstrated here, it is possible to produce a SEVACS module for
each of them.  In addition, there must be a finite and relatively small number of
possible schemes making re-usability a practicable proposition in the longer term.
In all 28 faults or disturbances have been hypothesised for the benchmark: IDV(1-20)
from the original benchmark plus F(1-8) added afterwards.  IDV(8-12) and IDV(16-
20) are intended to assess control system performance and hence, are of no interest
here. Incidents IDV(1-7) involve a step change, and F(1-8) involve a change in bias.
Table 4 shows those considered.
4.1 Specifying An Outline Distributed System
Type Numbers and interactions were hypothesised by performing step tests on the
process control systems’ set-points one by one.  It was found that the three level
processes are capacitive (Type Numbers > 0) because their related controller outputs
don’t change or deviate in steady state when their set-points’ are step changed.  All
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the other SEVACS related processes are open-loop stable or have an even number of
unstable poles2.  SEVACS interactions were hypothesised in two parts: first those
SEVACS that interact were sought, then the type of interaction was established.  If a
set-point change in a SEVACS results in any steady state change of an element in
another SEVACS, then the latter SEVACS is affected by the former.  If each
SEVACS is viewed as a super-node, in which all control system elements are lumped
together, a branch or a link from the former super-node to the latter one can be
assigned.  A simple SDG representing process interactions can then be constructed by
repeating this operation for all SEVACS.  Fig. 8 shows that derived for the T-E
benchmark.  For example, the positive change of A/C composition set-point in the A-
feed flow results in steady state changes in the outputs of the reactor pressure
controller (−), the product flow rate controller (−), the condenser cooling controller
(+), the purge flow rate controller(−) and the stripper temperature controller (+); it
indicates that the super-node SV1 affects the super-nodes SV3, SV8, SV4, SV5 and
SV9.
As discussed previously, process interactions have causal signs and can affect control
systems in different ways.  In addition it is sometimes sensible to describe interactions
in a different way so that the right faults can be accommodated.  This is particularly
important here because of the prevalence of cascade control systems.  For cascade
control systems, and as discussed in Section 2.3, interactions can be treated as always
stemming from the inner loop. Thus for example, there is a cascade arrangement in
SV1, so the effects can be treated as stemming from the inner loop set-point FA (Fig.
9).  Having hypothesised the causal element of SV1, those elements directly affected
are now hypothesised. For instance, the outermost/main controller node (PCR) in SV3
has deviated, so FA can be viewed as an exogenous disturbance to the controlled node,
reactor pressure PR. It is also possible that FA is an exogenous disturbance to the two
inner loops in SV3, but these effects can be ignored because if FA is the true fault, it
can still be inferred from the change of the outermost controller output (Section 2.3).
Directions can now be inferred. For instance, FA has a negative impact on PR because
the positive change of FA causes a negative change of output of the reactor pressure
controller and because of the negative proportional gain of this controller. For the
same reason, FA has a positive impact on the product flow rate Fo in SV8, a positive
impact on the condenser cooling temperature TCCW in SV4, a positive impact on the
purge flow rate FPRG in SV5 and a negative impact on the stripper temperature TSTR in
SV9.  Other effects or interactions between internal nodes in different super-nodes
can be determined in a similar way.  
Additional measurements, which are not within any control systems, are useful and
might therefore be considered in fault isolation. These include the temperature and
pressure in the separator, the pressure in the stripper, the compressor work and the
recycle flow rate. These can be viewed as ‘sink’ nodes on the simple SDG.  For
instance, the following are sink nodes of SV3: separator pressure, stripper pressure.
                                                
2 Both kinds of processes are analysed the same way (Chen, 2000).
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4.2 Specification and Performance of Individual SEVACS Nodes
This section describes the form of the SEVACS individual nodes.  Standard nodes
like SV1, SV4, SV5 and SV6 have already described in Section 2.  This leaves the
relatively standard triple loop (like SV3 & SV9) and the special cases (SV2, SV7 &
SV8).  Although not detailed, fault or disturbance directions can be determined also
from the relevant equations.
Cascade Control Systems with Triple Loops: SV3, SV9
A SDG representation of SV3 (the reactor pressure, temperature cascade control
system) is shown in Fig. 10.  In this system, the reactor pressure PR is controlled by
the controller PCR by manipulating the reactor temperature TR, which is controlled by
the controller TCR by manipulating the reactor cooling water temperature TRC, which
is controlled by the controller TCRC by manipulating the cooling water valve opening
VR. θPR is the set-point of the reactor pressure.  The circled part of the system in Fig.
10 can be viewed as a virtual valve VR′ enabling the standard cascade SEVACS
analysis approach to be applied to this system. 
In some circumstances the same fault or disturbance will affect different loops in
SV3, e.g. a change in reactor level will affect both dPR and dTR. In this case, the fault
or disturbance would still be determined by its effect to the outer loop from node dPR
for two reasons (see Section 2.3).  Firstly, once both the outer loop and the inner loop
deviate, the fault should not be from or related to the inner loop directly.  Secondly,
although the fault or disturbance can cause both the inner and outer loop controller to
deviate, the direction of the fault should be determined by the deviation in the outer
loop controller.  This is because the direction of the deviation in the inner loop
controller might be ambiguous so that the fault direction is not easily determined by it
(Equations 7-8).  A decision table is given in Table 5.
A similar approach can be taken for node SV9 (Product composition E, stripper
temperature cascade control system). The E composition in the product, EP, is
controlled by the controller ECP by manipulating the stripper temperature TP, which is
controlled by the controller TCP by manipulating the stripper heating steam flow rate
FPS, which is controlled by the controller FCPS by manipulating the steam valve
opening VPS. θEP is the set-point of the E composition in the product.  A decision table
is given in Table 6. 
Non-Standard Control Systems: SV2
SV2 focuses on the G/H composition, reactor level control system.  Fig. 11 shows a
block diagram representation that is pseudo-linear.  Four controllers, two valves and
four processes are involved.  Controller output x0 represents the demanded ratio of the
flow rate of D (y1) to the flow rate of E (y2).  This ratio is important for two reasons:
to maintain the G/H composition ratio in the final product θ0 at its set-point θr0, and to
maintain the reactor level θ at the set-point θr.  Variables dm0, dm1, dm2 and dm
represent respective sensor biases, dv1 and dv2 represent respective valve biases, d′p0,
d′p1, d′p2 and dp represent respective process disturbances. Parameter Kd is the steady
state gain of the level process disturbance transfer function Gd(s), similar to Kp, it also
tends to infinity. All variables represent deviations from their nominal values.
The circled part in Fig. 11 can be viewed as the D/E flow ratio (r) control system,
which can then be viewed as the inner loop of the cascade system shown in Fig. 12.
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Linearising the equations about D/E flow operating point leads to r=αy1-βy2 and
dmr=αdm1-βdm2 (α>0, β>0). Because Gp(s) is a capacitive process, at a steady state, it
then follows that 
0 1 2m mx d d rα β= − + (11)
2 2mx y d= + (12)
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Some observations that can be derived from these equations are summarised in Table
7.  It can be seen that the change of dv1 and d′p1 can only cause x1 to change and the
change of dv2 and d′p2 can only cause x2 to deviate, because all these variables are in
the innermost loops in the control system.  
Non-Standard Control Systems: SV7/SV8
Nodes SV7 and SV8 have to be considered together because product flow rate
appears in both.  SV7 represents the stripper level, product flow rate cascade control
system. SV8 represents the product flow rate, C flow rate cascade control system. Fig.
13 shows a block diagram for these two control systems and roughly in which the
upper part represents SV8 and the lower one represents SV7. θ1,1 and θ1,2 represent
the product flow rate and the stripper level, θr,1 and θr,2 are their set-points
respectively. Although SV7 and SV8 are two standard cascade control systems, they
have a common controlled variable, product flow rate θ1,1, which is the inner loop
controlled variable in SV7 as well as the outer loop controlled variable in SV8. As
such these two interact and should not be considered separately. 
In SV7, the stripper level is actually controlled by manipulating the product flow rate
out of the stripper through processes Gz11(s) and Gz22(s) with steady state gains Kz11
and Kz22 respectively, and the C flow rate into the stripper through the process Gz12(s)
with a steady state gain Kz12. In SV8, the product flow rate is actually controlled by
manipulating the level of the stripper through processes Gz12(s) and Gz21(s) with
steady state gains Kz12 and Kz21 respectively, and the product valve opening y2,2
through Gz11(s) with a steady state gain Kz11. 
In SV8, x1,1 and x2,1 are the outputs of the outer loop controller Gc11(s), with the
proportional gain Kc1,1, and the inner loop controller Gc21(s), with the proportional
gain Kc2,1. e1,1 and e2,1 represent the control errors to these two controllers
respectively. dv,1, d′p2,1, d′p1,1, dm2,1 and dm1,1 represent the bias of the valve Gv1(s) with
the steady state gain Kv,1, the disturbance to the inner loop process Gp21(s), with the
steady state gain Kp2,1, the disturbance to the product flow rate related processes
Gz11(s) and Gz21(s), with steady state gains Kz1,1 and Kz2,1 respectively, the inner loop
sensor bias and the outer loop sensor bias in SV8, in which dm1,1 is also as the inner
loop sensor bias in SV7. 
In SV7, x1,2 and x2,2 are the outputs of the outer loop controller Gc12(s), with the
proportional gain Kc1,2, and the inner loop controller Gc22(s), with the proportional
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gain Kc2,2. e1,2 and e2,2 represent the control errors to these two controllers
respectively. dv,2, dp1,2 and dm1,2 represent the bias of the valve Gv2(s) with the steady
state gain Kv,2, the disturbance to the level related processes Gz12(s) and Gz22(s), with
steady state gains Kz1,2 and Kz2,2 respectively, and the level sensor bias in SV7. Gd12(s)
with a steady state gain Kd1,2 represents a disturbance process from dp1,2 to the level
θ1,2.  Note that the level related processes are capacitive, which means Gz12(s), Gz22(s)
and Gd12(s) have the same denominator and their respective steady state gains Kz1,2 →
+∞, Kz2,2 → −∞ and Kd1,2 → ±∞. However, any ratio between two of these three
steady state gain should be finite. Thus following qualitative equations can be
derived:
1,2
1,1 ,1 1,1 1,2 2,1
1,2
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]dr m p m
z
K
x d d d
K
θ   = − − +   
(15)
'
2,1,1 1,1 1,2 1
2,1 1,2
2,1 ,1 2,1 ,1 2,1 ,1 2,1 ,1 1,2 ,1
[ ][ ] [ ] [ ][ ] [ ]
{ } { } { } { }
pr m d v
p
p v p v p v p v z v
dd K dx d
K K K K K K K K K K
θ   = − − − −   
(16)
[x1,2]= [θr,1] (17)
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v z v z v z
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dK dd
K K K K K
θ θ  = − −   
  + − −   
(18)
Based on the above qualitative equations, a decision table for fault detection and
diagnosis can be made (Table 8).  Directions of various faults or disturbances can be
also determined from these equations.
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5. Some Results
The effects of the various faults and disturbances were observed by simulating each in
turn and looking at the long-term (i.e. pseudo steady state) responses.  Sections 5.1
and 5.2 describe how two of these incidents, IDV(1) and F(3), would be analysed by
the steady state based procedures.  Section 5.3 then looks more generally at the
performance of the SEVACS when subjected to any of the faults and disturbances.
Section 5.4 describes, briefly, how governing equations might be incorporated into the
Supervisor.
5.1  IDV(1): Lower A/C Feed Ratio Whilst Keeping the Composition of B in Stream 4
Constant
In the steady state, SV1, SV5 and SV8 will be affected.  SV1: the A, C composition
ratio (A/C) controller and the A feed flow rate controller have positive deviations.
SV5: the purge B composition controller and the purge rate controller have negative
deviations.  SV8: the product flow rate controller and the C feed flow rate controller
have negative deviations.  From Fig. 8 and by applying the fault isolation principle,
the following relevant sub-set can be obtained: {dm1(SV8)} ⊂ Dp1(SV1).   Here
dm1(SV8) is used to denote the deviation in the sensor bias in the outer loop of SV8
and Dp1(SV1) is used to denote the set of disturbances that pertain to the outer loop of
SV1.
If a fault isolation procedure is applied then: 
search process: starting from the super-node SV1, dm1(SV1)_low and
Dp1(SV1)_low would form a fault candidate set because of the outer-loop
controller deviation; since {dm1(SV8)}⊂ Dp1(SV1) and because of the sign of the
interaction (Fig. 9), dm1(SV8)_high would then be appended;
test process: from Fig. 8, dm1(SV1)_low would be rejected because its descendants
in SV1, SV3, SV4, SV5, SV8 and SV9 should deviate; dm1(SV8)_high would be
rejected because, on the basis of the fault isolation principal, it should cause SV1,
SV2, SV3, SV4, SV5, SV6, SV8 and SV9 to deviate.  As it stands set Dp1(SV1) is
nominally empty because it doesn’t contain ‘unknown’ disturbances.  Further
knowledge is required.  For instance if a more detailed SDG representation of the
process is available then this could be used to generate more hypotheses.
Alternatively a list of likely causes (e.g. as in Table 5) might be available, which
could be used in a simulation to predict the various effects.  Another possibility is
that, having been notified that a fault or disturbance to nodes SV1, SV5 & SV8 has
arisen with candidate set Dp1(SV1)_low, the operator might provide his own
hypotheses.  Suppose that he was to hypothesise IDV(1) & IDV(2), and these were
simulated to obtain steady state effects.  Then IDV(2) would be rejected because it
would be seen to cause SV1, SV2, SV3, SV5, SV8 and SV9 to deviate.  This
would leave IDV(1), which can cause SV1, SV5 and SV8 to deviate in the above
directions. 
Some of the deviations sought by the search process didn’t actually happen in the
simulation.  However sufficient super-nodes did deviate to enable the process to
eliminate the alternatives. Also it is worth pointing out that IDV(1) is just one
disturbance, other disturbances might exist that have similar effects and this
possibility should not be ruled out.  It is therefore important that a dialogue takes
place with the operators to ensure that the system ‘learns’.
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5.2  F(3): Reactor-Level-Sensor-Bias-Low
In the steady state, although the fault actually occurred in SV2, this would not be
apparent, locally, because the level process is capacitive and nothing wrong would be
observed in SV2. However SV3, SV4, SV5, and SV9 will be affected.  SV3: the
reactor pressure controller and the reactor temperature controller have positive
deviations, and the reactor cooling controller has a negative deviation.  SV4: the
condenser cooling controller has a negative deviation.  SV5: the purge flow rate
controller has a positive deviation.  SV9: the stripper temperature controller and the
stripper steam controller have negative deviations.  The additional measurements, the
compressor work and the recycle flow rate will also deviate, negatively.
 
Search process: starting from the super-node SV3, the fault candidate set would be
{dm1(SV3)} ∪ Dp1(SV3) ⊃ {dm1(SV1), dm1(SV2), dm1(SV4), dm1(SV5), dm1(SV8)}.
Note that this contains the outer loop sensor bias for SV2 i.e. reactor-level-sensor-
bias because the reactor level process is capacitive and hence the sensor bias can
be viewed as a process disturbance to SV3.
Test process: dm1(SV3) can be rejected because additional measurements, the
separator pressure and the stripper pressure, don’t deviate.  Bias dm1(SV4) can be
rejected because it should lead to deviations in SV2, SV6 and SV8; biases
dm1(SV1) and dm1(SV8) can be rejected because neither SV1 nor SV8 deviate; bias
in dm1(SV5) can be rejected because it should lead to a deviation in SV8.  This
leaves the bias dm1(SV2) i.e. the reactor-level-sensor-bias, which can cause SV3,
SV4, SV5 and SV9 to deviate in the observed directions. 
Once again it is unlikely that the observed effects can be attributed, uniquely, to one
fault, other disturbances or faults might affect Dp1(SV3).  It is therefore important that
a dialogue takes place with the operators and that any new scenarios are recorded to
improve the performance of the system.  Suppose that IDV(2) has been previously
stored in the knowledge-base: since there are no deviations in SV2 and IDV(2) is a
disturbance to SV2, IDV(2) would be rejected.
5.3 SEVACS Performance in General
Table 9 was constructed by simulating the various faults and disturbances and
observing the steady state changes in the controller outputs.  An ‘H’ is used to
indicate those incidents that could not be diagnosed by applying a steady state
approach but could be diagnosed by applying heuristic rules instead.  Slow drift,
IDV(13), would not be diagnosed.  The results can also be represented by sub-sets
associated with the various process disturbances and sensor biases and this
information could be stored in a knowledge-base.  For instance, for node SV1:
{IDV(1), IDV(2),F(5)}⊂ Dp1(SV1), IDV(6)⊂Dp2(SV1), dm1(SV1) = A/C composition
analyser bias, dm2(SV1) = A flow rate sensor bias and for node SV5: {IDV(1), IDV(2),
F(5)}⊂ Dp1(SV5), {F(2), F(3), F(4)} ⊂ Dp2(SV5), dm1(SV5) = F(1) and dm2(SV5) =
purge flow rate sensor bias.  
Although Table 9 shows that there is merit in combining the outputs from the
SEVACS, it doesn’t say much else.  Most of the important information is contained in
the various sub-sets.  For instance, superficially, IDV(3), IDV(4), & F(4) appear to
affect SV3 the same way but in practice they affect the control system at different
nodes: IDV(4) is a disturbance to the innermost loop (dTRC), IDV(3) is a disturbance to
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the second inner loop (dTR), whereas F(3) causes a disturbance to the outermost loop
(dPR).  Another interesting point is with IDV(2): IDV(2) ∈ Dp(SV2) and IDV(2) ∈
D′p0(SV2) i.e. it causes a different ‘pattern’ of controller outputs to deviate.
5.4 Governing Equations
Faults F(5)-F(7) would violate certain governing equations and hence could be
detected using a combination of governing equations with SEVACS.  The approach is
first to generate a set of candidates by analysing the appropriate governing equations
(Howell, Chen & Zhang, 1997); various possibilities are then eliminated by referring
to SEVACS knowledge.  If the material accumulations in the vessels are ignored, then
the following mass balance equations can be obtained provided that there are
additional measurements for Stream 5 and Stream 7:
Stream1 + Stream2 + Stream3 + Stream5 + Stream8 − Stream6 = 0                 (19)
Stream6 − Stream8 − Stream9 − Stream10 = 0                                                    (20)
Stream4 + Stream10 − Stream5 − Stream11 = 0                                                 (21)
Stream1 + Stream2 + Stream3 + Stream4 − Stream9 − Stream11 = 0               (22)
Stream6 − Stream7 = 0                                                                                        (23)
Values, averaged over the relatively short period time, say 5 minutes, were used to
overcome random deviations, disturbances and uncertainties in the process. In
addition, the benchmark’s ‘chemical’ units of flow rate (kscmh and m3/h) were
changed to kg/h to perform mass balances.  Any of the constraints were then deemed
to be in conflict if their error exceeded 5% of the total mass either into or out of the
node. Every 5 minutes a 16-element vector was generated for each equation, which
described that which could be deduced from that equation at that time. The first 11
elements pertained to the states of the streams, whilst the last five represented a leak
from each unit; N denoted normality, H denoted high, L denoted low and U denoted
undetermined; the subscript denoted likeliness of the fault, the bigger the number, the
more likely the fault. For instance Equation 20 might have suggested (Stream6-BIAS-
LOW) or (Stream8-BIAS-HIGH) or (Stream9-BIAS-HIGH) or (Stream10-BIAS-
HIGH), which would be output as [U1 U1 U1 U1 U1 L1 U1 H1 H1 H1 U1 N1 N1 N1 N1
U1]. These statements were then combined by applying the operator defined in Table
10, where R is the ambiguous result L^H.  +For example, suppose that the governing
equations pertaining to Equations 20 and 21 are violated resulting in the output of
governing vectors v1, v2, …, and v5:
v1=[N1 N1 N1 U1 N1 N1 U1 N1 U1 U1 U1 U1 U1 U1 U1 U1],
v2=[U1 U1 U1 U1 U1 L1 U1 H1 H1 H1 U1 N1 N1 N1 N1 U1],
v3=[U1 U1 U1 H1 L1 U1 U1 U1 U1 H1 L1 U1 U1 U1 U1 H1],
v4=[N1 N1 N1 N1 U1 U1 U1 U1 N1 U1 N1 N1 N1 N1 N1 N1],
v5=[U1 U1 U1 U1 U1 N1 N1 U1 U1 U1 U1 N1 U1 U1 U1 U1].
Then, 
v1^v2^v3^v4^v5=[N1 N1 N1 N1 N1 N1 N1 N1 N1 H2 N1 N1 N1 N1 N1 N1] (24)
The 10th element of the vector (Equation 24) indicates that the sensor value of stream
10 is most likely to have failed high.
If fault F(5) happened, then the governing Equations 21 and 22 would be violated
whilst the others would not. Thus according to the logical operation, C-flow-rate-
sensor-bias-high (stream 4), product-flow-rate-sensor-bias-low (stream 11) and the
system leak would form a fault candidate set. Because C flow rate sensor is in the
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inner loop of a cascade system and referring to SEVACS knowledge in Section 2, this
sensor bias shouldn’t cause the inner loop controller to deviate and thus this sensor
bias would be rejected. 
If fault F(6) happened, the governing Equations 19 and 22 would be violated whilst
the others would not. Then A-flow-rate-sensor-bias-high (stream 1), D-flow-rate-
sensor-bias-high (stream 2), E-flow-rate-sensor-bias-high (stream 3) and the system
leak would form a fault candidate set. These three flow rate sensors are all in inner
loops, and according to Section 2, any inner loop sensor bias would cause the
respective outer loop controller to deviate, thus both A-flow-rate-sensor-bias-high
(stream 1) and E-flow-rate-sensor-bias-high (stream 3) would be rejected.
Fault F(7) is very similar to the fault F(6) and would be diagnosed similarly.
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6. Conclusions
Although the broad objective of this paper has been to show how a distributed hybrid
strategy might be applied to the isolation of faults and disturbances in the Tennessee
Eastman Process, the main emphasis has been on the application of a steady state
based approach.  It is intended that the strategy would build on existing structures for
distributed control systems, so would be easy to implement, cheap and widely
applicable.  Configuring would be performed in parallel with control loop tuning: step
tests would probably be needed to identify interactions between control systems.  The
steady state approach is qualitative model based and can work, to some extent with a
minimal amount of knowledge.  A way in which a knowledge-base might evolve to
improve isolation capabilities has been suggested in Section 5.  Knowledge is the key
to isolation and the role of the operator has been briefly discussed.
Being steady state based, there is clearly an issue of actually knowing when such a
state is obtained.  In fact with the application here, and in order to minimise delays in
reaching a decision, the process was often assumed to be in a steady state when it was
clearly on some long-term, asymptotic trajectory.  Although Chen & Howell (2001)
have identified possible algorithms, further investigation is still needed to make the
approach practicable.  Even when all the control loops attained a ‘steady state’, it was
sometimes difficult to detect small changes. Methods dealing with the possibility of a
certain deviation not being observed need to be considered also.
To meet the objective of ease of implementation, reliance must be placed on standard
templates.  It has been described how the T-E process would require a number of
‘non-standard’ templates because it has a few unusual control systems.  However
these have been produced relatively easily and if adopted by a commercial vendor, it
is clear that a reasonably extensive library could soon be developed.  Another issue
worthy of consideration is that of a plant refurbishment.  Following a plant
refurbishment it would be quite normal for the controllers to be re-tuned.  Revised
information would be obtained as part of this activity, which would be used to
reconfigure the SEVACS modules.
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